Although most scholars try to conceive Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Law and his Moral Theory as belonging to a System, there is a difficulty that challenges most of the interpreters: If there is a moral content that informs how positive Law should be enacted, and hence if Morals could evaluate Law, why does Kant say that civil disobedience and resistance to Law cannot rationally be allowed? This apparent incongruence acquires another significance when one considers the functional and structural differences that (...) Kant establishes between Law and Morals. If we take them seriously into account, we will realize that Kant operates a radical separation between Morals and Law, which can no longer derive its content from Morals, but instead looks for an increasingly more political foundation in Modernity. (shrink)

Modern societies often claim to be democracies in order to enjoy greater legitimacy. Still, to understand the concept of democracy and how to justify it, the definition of it as self-determined is not sufficient. A complex understanding has to take into account ideas of rule of law as well as human rights. Sometimes these three concepts compete with each other - particularly in societies with a pluralistic approach to what "the good life" should be, such as societies which are made (...) up of distinct cultural backgrounds. This book presents a concept of democracy that encompasses at the same time the ideas of rule of law, human rights and self-determination. It contains the main lectures of the XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, hosted by the Internationale Vereinigung fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil) in July 2013. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a concepção de esfera pública segundo o paradigma procedimental, associando-a à ideia de tolerância recíproca em Habermas, com intuito de compreender como os sujeitos podem se expressar e participar da construção dos sentidos do mundo. Também explora a arquitetura comunicativa da esfera pública sob o foco da práxis argumentativa, analisando os pressupostos pragmáticos que a rege. Ao interpretar essa dinâmica em consonância com a ideia de tolerância, Habermas entende que a liberdade de expressão na esfera pública é (...) atribuída a quem assume uma ética moralmente adequada. O objetivo central deste artigo é questionar a legitimidade desse condicionamento e propor o abandono da moldura do aceitável que circunscreve o poder de fala. (shrink)